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From its earliest issue back in 1995, responsibility has been a major theme in the
Journal of Science and Engineering Ethics. Although the focus of attention and
conceptions of responsibility vary considerably over the different articles, the
prevalence of responsibility as a topic is remarkable. On a superﬁcial reading, we
could see it as the logical corollary of the importance of responsibility for the
broader ﬁeld of applied ethics. However, this can only partly explain why
responsibility is such a widely discussed topic in the Journal of Science and
Engineering Ethics. If we take, for example, the academic journals for medical
ethics, responsibility is not half as frequently mentioned in the title or keywords.
1
Apparently, there is something special about the relation between responsibility and
technology and engineering.
To see what is special about responsibility in technology and engineering, one
should perhaps start with the kind of paradigmatic situation that is usually the focus
of attention in philosophical ethics, and even in most of the applied ethics literature.
In this paradigmatic situation, there is usually an individual that is confronted with a
difﬁcult ethical choice. Although the choice at hand is morally complex, it is usually
assumed that what raises ethical concerns are the possible actions of the individual
and the direct consequences of these actions. Moreover, it is usually assumed that
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assumes: (1) that it are individuals who act, (2) that the consequences of their
actions are causally direct traceable, and (3) that these consequences are certain.
None of these assumptions seem to apply to many of the ethical issues raised by
modern technology and engineering.
First, engineering and technology development typically take place in collective
settings, in which a lot of different agents, apart from the engineers involved,
eventually shape the technology developed and its social consequences. Second,
engineering and technology development are complex processes, which are
characterized by long causal chains between the actions of engineers and scientists
and the eventual effects that raise ethical concern. Third, social consequences of
technology are often hard to predict beforehand.
Jonas (1984) has suggested that the three characteristics of technological action
just mentioned (collectivity, indirect causation, uncertainty) require an ethics of
responsibility rather than an ethics based on traditional ethical notions like
consequences or duties. At the same time, it is clear that a lot of the traditional
philosophical literature on responsibility still ignores the mentioned characteristics.
Although philosophers have paid attention to the fact that consequences can be
realized in a multiplicity of ways (e.g. Fischer and Ravizza 1998), their focus often
is on rather direct consequences. Moreover, they tend to focus on responsibility for
certain outcomes rather than on responsibility for risks. What has been recognized
without doubt is the collective nature of action as witnessed by the vastly growing
literature on collective responsibility (e.g. Smiley 2008; May and Hoffman 1991;
French 1984).
There is yet another reason why responsibility is an important theme in
engineering and technology. Technology increasingly inﬂuences the context in
which humans have to act and so seems to co-shape their responsibility. An example
of this mediating role is the use of automatic pilots in planes. Who is responsible if a
plane with an automatic pilot crashes? Does it make sense to attribute responsibility
in such cases to technology or is it possible to understand these complex situations
so that all responsibility can in the end be attributed to humans? Examples like the
automatic pilot also raise interesting questions about the responsibility of designers.
It may be argued that they design the technological environment in which others
have to act and to exercise certain responsibilities. Can, and should, designers
design technological systems so that they enhance rather than limit the responsi-
bility of the users of these systems; and what does such an obligation exactly entail?
The articles collected in this issue have been presented at the conference ‘‘Moral
Responsibility: Neuroscience, Organization & Engineering,’’ which was held in
Delft, August 25–27, 2009. The central aim of this conference was to improve our
understanding of responsibility in our current society. By drawing on philosophical
and scientiﬁc expertise and insight, the discussion moved beyond the traditional
discussion on free will and determinism, which has dominated the philosophical
responsibility debate. One of the conclusions of the conference was that there is not
one unitary, agreed-upon deﬁnition of responsibility but that there are many
different meanings attached to the notion of responsibility, some being merely
descriptive, others having an explicitly normative content. By reﬂecting on these
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topical overview of how the theme responsibility in technology and engineering is
currently approached by different scholars in the ﬁeld.
Given the different meanings attached to the notion of responsibility, it is
important to start with some conceptual clariﬁcations. In fact, this is exactly what is
done in the contributions by Davis (forthcoming), Kermisch (forthcoming), Van de
Poel et al. (forthcoming), and Doorn (forthcoming). Davis provides the most ﬁne-
grained distinctions. Without revealing the full taxonomy here, we could say that
the different senses of responsibility can be classiﬁed along two main dimensions.
The ﬁrst one is a temporal one, referring to the distinction between forward-looking
responsibilities (that is, a sense of responsibility that refers to things that have not
yet occurred) and backward-looking responsibilities (that is, senses of responsibility
that refer to things that have happened in the past).
2 It should be noted that some
senses of responsibility contain both backward-looking and forward-looking
elements. For example, responsibility-as-liability is typically attributed on the basis
of past (causal) contributions that agents have made, but it also implies a duty to
rectify, or at least compensate for, damage or loss.
A further distinction could be made between (more or less) descriptive notions of
responsibility and normative notions of responsibility that imply an evaluation (e.g.
‘‘he is an irresponsible person’’) or a prescription (e.g. ‘‘you should pay because you
are responsible for what happened’’). The prime focus of most contributions in this
special issue is on such normative notions of responsibility.
The contributions to this special issue touch upon a number of themes and issues
in relation to responsibility in technology and engineering. For the purpose of this
introduction, we have consolidated them into three categories. The ﬁrst category is
what is also referred to as the problem of many hands, that is, the problem of
attributing responsibility in complex collective settings. This problem is, as we will
see, due to the collective nature of action in technology and engineering but also due
to the other two characteristics of technological action discussed above, that is, long
causal chains and uncertainty. The second theme, we distinguish, is responsibility
for risks. Although there has recently been a special issue of this journal (Volume
16. No. 3) devoted to this theme, it is still an issue that hasn’t been discussed a lot
(cf. Van de Poel and Nihlen-Fahlquist forthcoming). The third theme is the way
technologies shape the contexts of human actions, and the consequences of this
‘‘mediating role’’ for especially the responsibility of designers of new technology.
The Problem of Many Hands
The notion of ‘‘the problem of many hands’’ was originally introduced by Dennis
Thompson to refer to the difﬁculty of identifying the person responsible for some
outcome if a large number of people are involved in an activity (Thompson 1980).
2 This distinction is a bit similar to, but does not coincide with, the distinction that Davis makes between
future and historical uses of responsibility. Davis seems to reject the distinction between forward-looking
and backward-looking responsibility as he seems to believe that most, or even all, senses of responsibility
contain forward-looking and backward-looking elements.
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responsibility of public ofﬁcials. Because many different ofﬁcials, at various levels
and in various ways, contribute to policies and the decisions of the organization it is
difﬁcult to ascribe moral responsibility for the organization’s conduct in ﬁnal
instance. For outsiders of an organization who want to hold someone responsible for
a certain conduct, it is particularly difﬁcult, or even impossible, to ﬁnd any person
who can be said to have independently formed and carried out a certain policy or
taken some decision.
The various contributions show that there are different ways to conceive of the
problem of many hands. Davis is skeptical about whether there really is a problem.
He distinguishes between what he calls the problem of many hands and the problem
of many causes. The ﬁrst refers to what we above have alluded to as the collectivity
of engineering action, the second to the complexity of causal chains. Following up
on Thompson’s formulation, Davis suggests that the problem of many hands is the
problem to identify the person responsible for harm. This is mainly a problem for
outsiders, Davis argues, because insiders know very well who made what
contribution.
3 Conversely, solving the problem of many causes, on Davis’ reading,
requires that we know what counts as a cause. It is typical of engineers, Davis
argues, that they make it their responsibility to solve certain engineering problems.
Solving these problems is something engineers do, or should do, simply because
they are engineers, not because they caused the problem. Engineers have, in his
view, typically constructed their profession to foreclose the metaphysical argument
of many causes. Looking at engineering from an insider perspective, Davis argues,
there is no technological bar to the sort of decisions engineers have taken
responsibility for. In other words, the problem of many hands is less a problem for
engineers themselves than it is for outsiders.
Coeckelbergh (forthcoming), though not explicitly mentioning to the problem of
many hands, addresses the problem as well and he takes a different approach. For
him, the main problem derives from a tension between individual and distributed
action. He questions the adequacy of our traditional moral theories in situations of
engineering disasters. On the basis of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon
platform and the resulting casualties and ecological damage, Coeckelbergh argues
that the conditions for attributing moral responsibility laid down in traditional
theories make demands on agency, control, and knowledge that are seldom met in
engineering and technological action. On the basis of a Kierkegaardian notion of
tragedy, he develops an account of moral responsibility that tries to avoid the
dichotomy between freedom and fate, between activity and passivity. Accounting
for experiences of moral responsibility in technological culture and engineering
contexts requires that we recognize the tragic as a feature of the human condition.
This ‘‘tragic’’ account of moral responsibility has implications for how we assess
technological action. In line with Kierkegaard, it seems pointless to expect full,
absolute control, Coeckelbergh argues. Since there will always be events and things
3 For a contrasting view, see Nissenbaum, who argues that when the problem of many hands occur ‘‘…
victims and those who represent them are left without knowing at whom to point a ﬁnger. It may not be
clear even to the members of the collective itself who is accountable’’ (Nissenbaum 1996: 29).
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lack of control, the criterion of absolute control seems inadequate. It should be
replaced with a criterion that allows for a more gradual assessment. The same holds
for another condition for responsibility: knowledge. According to Coeckelbergh,
this is not a matter of all or nothing, but of degree. Therefore, where technological
action is concerned the question should not be whether or not a person is
responsible, but to what extent a person is responsible.
Although Coeckelbergh’s discussion is primarily about backward-looking
responsibilities, he also indicates how his reﬂections may be used to create more
responsible technological action in the future (forward-looking responsibility). He
argues for more epistemic transparency and the recognition that engineering is not
an individual but a collective enterprise that stands in need of collective, pooled
intelligence in order to contribute to responsible technological action. But here
again, recognizing the tragic character of engineering also requires acknowledging
that accidents might happen and that full control in technological action is
untenable.
More conceptual clarifying work is done in the contribution by Van de Poel et al.
(forthcoming). They take seriously the question raised by Davis; that is, the question
whether there is indeed a problem of many hands. In their paper, the authors
investigate how the problem of many hands can best be understood and why, and
when, it exactly constitutes a problem. They take the example of climate change to
illustrate how the ascription of backward-looking responsibility for collective harm
may in some situations be difﬁcult or even impossible. But is this also a moral
problem?, the authors ask. Building on (Bovens 1998), they discuss three
dimensions of the problem of many hands: a practical one (that is, the
epistemological problem that Davis referred to), a moral or normative one, and a
control dimension. Van de Poel et al. argue that the problem of many hands is best
conceived as a situation where there is a gap in the distribution of responsibility in a
collective setting which is problematic from a moral point of view. They content
that whether a gap is morally problematic depends on what one considers the
function of ascribing responsibility. This function, in turn, largely depends on what
(ethical) theory with respect to responsibility one adopts. Deontologists, for
example, emphasize retribution while consequentialists focus on efﬁcacy. But
difference senses of responsibility can also be associated with different functions.
Responsibility-as-blameworthiness, for example, is typically attributed for reasons
of retribution, whereas responsibility-as-liability often seems to be motivated by the
desire to do justice to (potential) victims. So rather than one problem of many
hands, there may be different varieties of the problem, each relating to a different
sense of responsibility and a different function of attributing responsibility.
The different functions of ascribing responsibility in technology development
and engineering, to which Van de Poel et al. refer, are central in Doorn’s
contribution to this special issue. She distinguishes three perspectives for ascribing
responsibility: a merit-based, a rights-based, and a consequentialist one. She
discusses these three perspectives in the light of a recent trend in moral philosophy,
and more speciﬁcally in the ﬁeld of engineering ethics, to shift the focus of ethics
from an abstract outsider’s perspective towards the practice in which moral
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towards an insider’s perspective might have implications for our practice of
ascribing responsibility. Based on recent discussions in engineering ethics literature,
she develops two ‘‘appropriateness criteria’’ for responsibility ascriptions in
engineering and technology development: (1) the approach should reﬂect people’s
basic intuitions of when it is justiﬁed to ascribe responsibility to someone; (2) the
approach should inform the direction of technology development and therewith
improve engineering design. This second criterion requires that the approach can be
applied to speciﬁc contextualized moral issues that are raised by speciﬁc
technological and scientiﬁc developments rather than to more general abstract
issues. Based on these ‘‘appropriateness criteria,’’ she discusses the pros and cons of
the three perspectives.
Using the example of the development of a new sewage water treatment plant,
Doorn shows how the different approaches for ascribing responsibilities have
different implications for engineering practice in general, and R&D or technological
design in particular. The paper concludes with the observation that there may be a
tension between the demands that follow from the different approaches, most
notably between fairness towards potential wrongdoers and the efﬁcacy of the
responsibility ascription. Since it is impossible to reduce the different demands into
one overarching criterion, there may be a problematic gap in the distribution of
responsibilities, which may, again, constitute an occurrence of the problem of many
hands.
Responsibility and Risk
With the discussion of the sewage water treatment plant, Doorn links the topic of
responsibility to that of technological risk, which is the second recurring theme in
this issue. In her contribution, Kermisch (forthcoming) analyses the relationship
between these concepts of risk and responsibility. She notes that this relationship is
not as simple as one might think. To state that someone should be held responsible
for a risk when some damage occurs is to miss the political and controversial
complexity, Kermisch argues. She contrasts the technical deﬁnition of risk (that is,
the statistical expectation value of unwanted events) with a social scientiﬁc
conception of risk. The former view is dominant in the traditional engineering
paradigm, where a distinction is made between the quantiﬁcation of risk (to be done
by technical experts and engineers) and the responsibility for managing the risks. In
this paradigm, the relation between risk and responsibility is therefore only an
indirect one, Kermisch explains.
In this traditional paradigm, risks are supposedly realistic, out there in the
external world. On the basis of the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas,
Kermisch shows how risks may also be viewed as being constructed through the
responsibilities they engage. Since each culture has a propensity to select those
dangers that contribute to the stabilization of the corresponding social organization,
thereby ‘‘translating’’ these into risks, while neglecting other dangers, risks are the
result of an interaction between social processes and the external world. According
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same way as the conceptualization of risk is: it contributes to the stabilization of
social organizations. The concepts of risk and responsibility are therefore
inseparable insofar as the notion of risk is constructed through the cultural
processes of responsibility and blame allocation, Kermisch explains.
As Kermish argues, the public increasingly demands experts and decision-
makers to behave responsibly in a prospective way as well, which includes an
attitude of care (virtue-responsibility). In order to integrate this moral dimension
in risk management, she discusses two additional frameworks in which the
relation between risk and responsibility is fully intertwined: the polithetic
conception of risk defended by Steve Rayner and the anatomy of risk developed
by Jonathan Wolff,
A similar plea for a more virtuous approach to responsibility is made by Roeser
(forthcoming). Her central message is that engineers should include emotional
reﬂection into their work in order to develop morally responsible technologies.
Roeser starts her contribution by questioning the ‘‘neutrality view’’ on technology;
that is, the view that technology is value neutral and engineering a predominantly
mathematical, quantitative discipline.
Similar to Kermisch, Roeser argues for the inclusion of moral considerations in
the decision making on risks, and for Roeser, emotions are an indispensable source
of insight into these moral considerations. She supports her claim with empirical
psychological research, which shows that emotions are a major determinant in the
risk perceptions of lay people. Roeser’s approach is original in that she argues for a
revaluation of emotions. These are not biases that threaten objectivity and
rationality in thinking about acceptable risks, as it is often argued, but they may
contribute to a correct understanding of the moral acceptability of a hazard,
according to Roeser. Emotions such as sympathy and empathy may provide insight
in fair distributions of risks and beneﬁts, whereas fear and worry can indicate that a
technology is a threat to human wellbeing. In order to adequately address these
issues, engineers should appeal to their emotions and include them in their work,
Roeser argues.
Roeser shows how emotions can also play a role in forward-looking responsi-
bility. Emotions such as sympathy, empathy and compassion can make people
aware how their actions can contribute to improving the situations of others.
Moreover, these emotions may also help to motivate to act accordingly. Although
backward-looking responsibility and its concomitant emotions are important in that
they let people critically reﬂect on what they have done in the past and how they
could have done things better, this should ultimately lead to enhanced emotional
sensitivity concerning forward-looking responsibility. The latter is especially
important in the context of technology development and design, because these
concern things that are yet to come. Roeser argues for a conception of responsibility
based on virtue ethics, which transcends formal responsibility of job descriptions,
such as to make the engineers become more involved. Moral emotions contribute to




The third recurring theme in this issue is about the mediating role of technology and
the question how artifacts and institutions can be designed so as to promote rather
than destroy responsibility. For instance, must expert systems necessarily take some
responsibility away from their users by creating epistemic niches for which nobody
can legitimately accept responsibility, or can responsibility be taken into account at
an earlier stage and be somehow designed into those systems?
The question how technology plays a role in our ability to discharge our
responsibilities is discussed in the paper by Polder-Verkiel (forthcoming). She links
the discussion of technological mediation to that of collective responsibility, more
speciﬁcally, to the backward-looking conception of collective responsibility: under
what circumstances can people in a collective be held responsible? The central
question in Polder-Verkiel’s contribution concerns the role of internet mediation.
On the basis of a comparison between the famous Kitty Genovese case, where a
person was assaulted and killed while 39 neighbors supposedly watched without
calling until it was too late, and an online case in which a young man committed
suicide in front of his webcam, Polder-Verkiel explores the salient differences
between the two situations. She argues that neither the number of onlookers, nor
their physical nearness, nor their anonymity has moral relevance when it comes to
holding them responsible. These factors do not directly affect any of the conditions
under which we can hold people responsible, Polder-Verkiel argues. However, two
other factors do have an effect: the perceived reality of the situation and the ability
to act. Although these factors are not unique to internet mediation, the way in which
the different factors are intrinsically connected to internet mediation does seem to
have a diminishing effect on responsibility in online situations.
The crucial conditions that Polder-Verkiel identiﬁes in her paper are related to
the so-called epistemic condition (people should know that a particular action or
inaction leads to bad outcomes) and control or freedom-of-action condition (people
should be able to take action) of responsibility. In the philosophical discussion of
responsibility, these two considerations are often mentioned as conditions that have
to be met before we can hold a person responsible.
Given that internet (or ICT systems, in general) can create situations in which
people are not able to discharge their responsibilities, how could we design
technical artifacts such that people’s ability for responsibility is enhanced rather
than constrained? This question is explicitly addressed in the contribution by Van
den Hoven et al. (forthcoming). Van den Hoven et al. start with the observation that
technology and engineering are usually treated as the source of ethical problems,
and ethics is treated as a constraint on engineering and technological development.
However, ethics can also be a source of technological development, Van den Hoven
et al. argue. Their particular argument is that technical innovation may be an
appropriate way to deal with situations of ‘‘moral overload’’ or ‘‘moral dilemmas.’’
Such situations are characterized by a plurality of moral demands which cannot be
met simultaneously. The philosophical literature has discussed a variety of
approaches to moral dilemmas but has tended to ignore approaches that aim at
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may all be met. One such an approach is technical innovation.
Van den Hoven et al. argue that if technical innovation implies an improvement
on all value dimensions, and thus that it diminishes moral overload, it entails moral
progress. Obviously, however, not all technical innovations do so. They therefore
suggest that engineers have a responsibility to develop those innovations that reduce
moral overload and so enable users, and other actors, to act responsibly.
Van den Hoven et al. propose the methodology of Value Sensitive Design to
systematically incorporate moral values into the design of technical artifacts and
systems. The central idea in this methodology is to look at design from an ethical
perspective, rather than making moral values a by-product.
The last contribution in this special issue is also related to technological
mediation. Swierstra and Waelbers (forthcoming) develop a framework (‘‘matrix’’)
that helps explore in advance how emerging technologies might plausibly affect the
reasons behind people’s (moral) actions. Similar to Polder-Verkiel and Van den
Hoven et al., Swierstra and Waelbers emphasize that technologies can inﬂuence
people’s actions. It is therefore important to look beyond the technological,
economical, and environmental aspects of technology, and to focus on its future
social roles. These social roles are classiﬁed on the basis of a two-dimensional
matrix. On the horizontal axis, the authors distinguish three basic types of reasons
that play a role in practical judgment: what is the case, what can be done and what
should be done. On the vertical axis, three classes of morally relevant issues are
distinguished: stakeholders, consequences and the good life. For each cell in the
matrix, technologies can simultaneously have a positive or negative contribution.
For this issue’s topic, responsibility, the cell at the intersection of the ‘‘stakeholder
row’’ and ‘‘ought column,’’ is the most relevant. Guiding questions identiﬁed with
this cell are: Will the technology mediate our duties and responsibilities? Will the
technology expand or lessen our duties and responsibilities? These and other
questions could help professionals in understanding the potential social role of the
technologies they develop. On the basis of the Google PowerMeter, an online
monitoring tool that provides energy consumption information by utility smart
meters and energy monitoring devices, the authors illustrate how this matrix can
support the moral imagination of technology developers and engineers.
Theauthorsarguethatitisimpossibletobefullycertainaboutatechnology’sfuture
social role. This brings us back to contribution by Coeckelbergh, who argued—in
similarvein—thatitisourhumanconditiontolivewithuncertainty.Asitisimpossible
to strive for full control in engineering and technological action, so should we not
expecttoknowexactlywhatsocialroleatechnologywillhaveinthefuture,theauthors
argue. However, this should not exempt professionals from their responsibility to try
developing new technologies in such a manner that the social role will be desirable.
Taking Stock
What could we conclude on the basis of these contributions, what are the
implications for the practice of engineering? A ﬁrst observation relates to the
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one can distinguish between backward-looking notions of responsibility, which are
often related to accountability and blame, and forward-looking responsibility, which
can be understood as a virtue or a moral obligation to see to it that a certain state-of-
affairs applies. Although some of the contributions (also) pay attention to backward-
looking responsibility, in particular Polder-Verkiel, Coeckelberg and Van de Poel
et al., most emphasize the forward-looking responsibility of engineers.
Interestingly, this trend is a reversal of the common pattern in philosophy, where
the emphasis is usually on responsibility-as-blameworthiness. This suggests that in
engineering practice, forward-looking responsibility is more important than
backward-looking responsibility. As Davis suggests, engineers are usually less
interested in blame for things that have gone wrong but rather tend to take
responsibility for somehow improving technologies and ultimately the world.
Related to this is a suggestion that resonates in several contributions that
engineering ethics should pay attention to the characteristics of engineering practice
itself and adopt an insider perspective. Although their approach and their conclusion
are distinctly different, both Davis and Coeckelbergh seem to argue for a more
empirically informed perspective on responsibility. For Davis this means: taking an
insider perspective and see what responsibility engineers take upon themselves,
rather than focusing on holding responsible. Coeckelbergh’s main concern is the
acceptance of the tragic element in the human condition. Also Doorn’s contribution
can be read as a plea for an internalistic approach.
Another lesson to be learnt from this issue is the point that the neutrality view on
technology is untenable. Kermisch and Roeser discuss this point in the light of risk
management and risk acceptance. They show that an adequate addressing of risks
requires more than merely quantitative considerations. Interestingly, both authors
appeal to insights from virtue ethics to support their recommendations.
Van den Hoven et al., Swierstra and Waelbers, and Roeser all argue for
explicitly including moral values in the development and design of technology.
Although technology is not value-neutral, it is not necessary to either categorically
embrace or reject technology, the authors agree. Technology should be developed
with due attention for its moral implications. This is where the engineers’ and
technology developers’ responsibility comes into play. Given the potential of
technology, engineers and technology developers have a responsibility to use this
potential for the better. However, where Roeser mainly focuses on the
responsibility of engineers, Van den Hoven et al. and Swierstra and Waelbers
take the responsibility of the end user into account as well. Technology can play a
role in enhancing, or limiting, the end user’s capacity for responsibility. Engineers
have a meta-task responsibility—to use the words of Van den Hoven et al.—to
design technology in such a way that the responsibility of the end user is
enhanced instead of limited. Roeser goes furthest in terms of practical
recommendations. She argues for a reform of the engineering curricula, which
should include courses that enhance the emotional and imaginative capacities of
future engineers.
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